Abstract The recognition that resilience is a critical aspect of infrastructure security has caused the national and homeland security communities to ask ''How does one ensure infrastructure resilience?'' Previous network resilience analysis methods have generally focused on either pre-disruption prevention investments or post-disruption recovery strategies. This paper expands on those methods by introducing a stochastic optimization model for designing network infrastructure resilience that simultaneously considers pre-and post-disruption activities. The model seeks investment-recovery combinations that minimize the overall cost to a distribution network across a set of disruption scenarios. A set of numerical experiments illustrates how changes to disruption scenarios probabilities affect the optimal resilient design investments.
Introduction
Many elements of critical infrastructure take the form of networks. These networks provide service by allowing flows (of materials, information, electric power, fuels, etc.), given a capacity or operability state for nodes and links. Disruptions change the operability state of parts of the network (nodes and/or links), and recovery is a set of actions to restore capacity to damaged parts of the network, allowing system performance to return to nominal levels as quickly as possible. Since the 1980s, U.S. Federal Government policy toward critical infrastructure protection has focused primarily on physical asset protection and hardening (Reagan 1982; Clinton 1998; Bush 2002 Bush , 2003 , but there is now increasing emphasis on infrastructure resilience-the ability of infrastructure systems to withstand, adapt to, and rapidly recover from the effects of a disruptive event. Examples of this policy shift include Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8; Obama 2011) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) (DHS 2009) contains explicit language calling for increasing the resilience of the nation's critical infrastructure.
Flow networks have production nodes (electric power generation, manufacturing plants, etc.), storage nodes (water supply reservoirs, warehouses, etc.), and consumption nodes. Whatever is flowing through the network is moving from production to consumption (possibly including intermediate storage), via a set of links (roads, electric power transmission lines, water mains, etc.) that form a connected network. The flow pattern in the network is typically determined by a set of costs for production and material movement across links, and a set of constraints: available supplies (capacities) at production nodes, demand requirements at consumption nodes, and flow limits represented by link and/or node capacity constraints.
Increasing network resilience involves three related capabilities-providing absorptive capacity so that the network can withstand disruptions, providing adaptive capacity so that flows through the network can be accommodated via alternate paths, and providing restorative capacity so that recovery from a disruptive event can be accomplished quickly and at minimum cost. Design for resilience focuses on the critical question: What investments should be made in the network to best provide these three related capabilities, and to make the network as resilient as possible against a range of potential, but uncertain, disruptions?
As Park et al. (2012) note, risk analysis is not sufficient to answer the resilience design question. Risk analysis has fundamentally different assumptions, objectives, and methods than are necessary for resilience analysis. Resilience is a dynamic, emergent property that must be continually managed and is characterized by a lack of certainty. They rightly note that classic risk analysis methods are not sufficient for resilient design and that a departure from traditional design practices is needed.
The uncertainty of potential future disruptions makes the use of scenarios important. The set of defined scenarios can cover a wide range of potential occurrences, and incorporation of multiple scenarios in the pre-event design optimization allows the most effective investment decisions to be made. The purpose of the model and analysis in this paper is to demonstrate a stochastic optimization that considers simultaneously the impacts of pre-event resilience-enhancing design investments and post-event recovery actions in infrastructure networks.
In Sect. 2, we describe related previous work to set the stage for the general model formulation presented in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we illustrate the formulation using a specific example of a distribution network, and Sect. 5 contains the results of several experiments using this example, to show the types of design insights that the scenario-based stochastic optimization approach can provide. Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for further research.
Previous related work
There are separate threads of the literature dealing with vulnerability, reliability, and recovery in infrastructure networks. The model described in this paper has some connection to all three of these threads, but is not the direct outgrowth of any of them.
Vulnerability assessment seeks to identify network elements (links and/or nodes) whose failure would cause the most disruption in the functioning of the network. This includes conceptual/theoretical work (e.g., Klau and Weiskircher 2005; Qiang and Nagurney 2008; Merrel et al. 2010 ) and applications to various types of infrastructure networks. For example, Chassin and Posse (2005) focus on the North American electrical grid. Murray-Tuite and Mahmassani (2004) , Jenelius et al. (2006) , Scott et al. (2006) , Chen et al. (2007) , and Bell et al. (2008) have all made contributions related to road networks. Guercio and Xu (1997) and Shinstine et al. (2002) analyzed vulnerability and reliability in water distribution systems. Vulnerability assessments are important and can help identify network elements that are likely candidates for resilience-enhancing investment, but they do not provide direct system design guidance.
Improving network reliability is the focus of a second thread of research and has applications in wireless communication, water distribution, and transportation networks. In a general sense, reliability can be defined as the ability of a system to perform its desired function at an acceptable level for some defined period of time. The events that might cause failures of system elements could be either random or targeted. Reliability-based analyses typically focus on the degree to which a network can withstand certain types of disruptions but do not include the recovery processes that are important in resilience. Useful examples of the work in reliability for transportation networks are provided in the edited volume by Bell and Iida (2003) and the survey by Heydecker et al. (2007) . Examples of reliability-based design for water distribution networks are provided by Shinstine et al. (2002) and Suribabu and Neelakantan (2008) . There is a great deal of work on reliability in wireless communication networks. A few examples of recent work on reliability-based design are Khandani et al. (2008) , Vaze and Heath (2008) , and Salami et al. (2011) .
There is also considerable literature on system recovery in infrastructure networks following a disruptive event. As important examples, see the work of Xu et al. (2007) on electric power restoration, Clausen et al. (2010) on airline system recovery, Luna et al. (2011) on water distribution networks, Wang et al. (2011) for internet protocol (IP) networks, and Chen and Miller-Hooks (2012) related to freight transportation networks. Analyses of recovery strategies are important, but do not address the challenge of determining pre-event investments to enable the most effective recovery in a variety of potential disruption scenarios.
Models that focus on post-event actions can be used in an ad hoc approach to determine benefits that could result from specific efforts to enhance resilience, but this approach frequently must be an iterative process, can be time-consuming, and does not guarantee that one will identify an optimal or near-optimal set of resilience-enhancing investments.
Concern with design for resilience in infrastructure systems has appeared in a variety of contexts in recent years (e.g., Little 2002; Fiksel 2003; Petersen and Johansson 2008; Mansouri et al. 2010) . Sherali et al. (2011) have recently developed an interesting way of looking at a form of design for resilience in situations that can be modeled as decision trees (i.e., a relatively small number of discrete design choices). In their model, investments can be made that either change the probabilities of success for various corrective actions following a disruption or that ameliorate various consequences. Thus, they can invest in either the probability side or the consequence side of risk, and the model finds solutions that allocate a limited budget optimally so as to reduce the expected value. Lou and Zhang (2011) offer a different type of designfor-resilience model, focused on either random disruptions, or targeted attacks on transportation networks. Their model is based on related actions of three different stakeholdersusers of the network, an attacker, and a defender. They develop an optimization model for the defender of the network to find the network investments (discrete changes in link capacity) that minimize the consequences of the worst-case scenario within an allowable set. Focusing on the worst-case scenario simplifies the uncertainty inherent in the resilient design problem, but this approach creates a solution that may be too focused on mitigating a single potential scenario and not as good against the many other scenarios that could occur.
In order to design infrastructure systems that are maximally resilient to a range of threats, infrastructure planners and managers need a capability that simultaneously considers the impacts of pre-event resilience-enhancing design investments and post-event recovery actions across a range of possible scenarios. Investments to increase absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and restorative capacity should all be considered, and the measure of effectiveness for resilience should reflect the dynamic state of the network, as recovery activities are undertaken after an event. These are the guiding elements of the model formulation described in the next section.
3 Resilience measurement and optimization Vugrin et al. (2010) define system resilience as:
Given the occurrence of a particular disruptive event (or set of events), the resilience of a system to that event (or set of events) is the ability to reduce effectively both the magnitude and duration of the deviation from targeted system performance levels.
This definition is quite similar to other recent definitions, including those by Haimes (2009) and Croope and McNeil (2011) .
The systemic impact (SI) for a network resulting from a disruptive event is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The occurrence of an event reduces some performance metric for the system, and through recovery effort, this metric returns to its targeted level over time, as shown in Fig. 1a . SI is the area of the degraded performance, as shown in Fig. 1b .
Recovery requires the expenditure of resources, and the total recovery effort (TRE) represents the cumulative resources used for a selected recovery strategy. Varying strategies for recovery may affect SI, but require different levels of recovery effort (cost), as shown in Fig. 2a . It may also be possible to make investments in the system (design improvements) that will reduce the magnitude of the disruption from a given event occurrence as well as speed system recovery, as shown in Fig. 2b . These expenditures are defined as resilience-enhancing investments (REI). Thus, as we consider system resilience, and design for resilience in particular, it is important to incorporate all three elements-REI, SI, and TRE-as they vary across some set of potential disruption scenarios.
In general, a system will have several performance metrics, and SI measurement must include all the relevant performance dimensions. In some cases, the performance degradation will be measured as an increase in costs (for operating and using the system, for example), and the measurement of SI will be the area above the nominal cost level, rather than below as shown in the example in Figs. 1 and 2. These variations are not conceptual differences, but simply reflect different performance measures that may be relevant in different situations. The separation of pre-event investments and post-event recovery actions casts the problem into a form that lends itself well to two-stage stochastic optimization. In a twostage model, some decisions must be made before instances of random elements in the model are available and other decisions are made after the specific random instance is known. The initial decisions are called first-stage variables, and the decisions made in response to specific random instances are called second-stage, or recourse, variables. The feasible sets for the second-stage variables are conditioned on the first-stage decisions, and the model seeks to find the set of first-stage decisions that are optimal against the range of potential random outcomes. Good general descriptions of stochastic optimization models are provided by Kall and Wallace (1994) or Birge and Louveaux (1997) . In the current context, the REI decisions are the first-stage variables and the recovery decisions are the second-stage variables.
The random elements of two-stage stochastic optimization models can be represented in a variety of ways, but one very useful form is through the definition of a discrete set of scenarios, each of which has an associated probability of occurrence. If the scenario set is defined carefully, a wide range of possible events can be represented and included in the analysis. In the model described here, these scenarios are used to specify levels and locations of disruption to the infrastructure network (i.e., loss of capacity at production nodes and damage to links). The scenarios are indexed by s = 1, 2, …, S, and the associated probabilities are p s . For the general model, we consider a collection of production nodes F j , indexed by j = 1, 2, …, J; a collection of network links or arcs through which flow occurs, indexed by a = 1, 2, …, A; a collection of demands or consumption nodes indexed by i = 1, 2, …, I; and a collection of recovery resources indexed by k = 1, 2, …, K. Variables representing REI associated with production nodes are w j (e.g., increased capability as a form of absorptive capacity); variables for arcs are z a (e.g., provision of increased capacity on existing arcs or addition of new arcs, as a form of adaptive capacity); and R k represents investment in an increased level of recovery resource k. We associate unit costs, F j , G a , and H k with these three types of investments.
If values of the three types of REI variables are chosen, then in period t = 1, 2, …, T after the initiating events in scenario s, flows, x s at , occur on the network links as the production nodes attempt to meet demands, and resources, r The general model formulation is shown in Fig. 3 . The third line of the objective function, Eq. (1), contains variables v s that allow penalizing scenarios that produce very high costs. Across the set of disruption scenarios, the total cost impact (SI ? TRE) will vary, resulting in a probability distribution of total impact. A conceptual version of such a distribution is shown in Fig. 4 . The version in Fig. 4 is drawn as a continuous probability density function rather than as a discrete probability mass function, but this distinction is unimportant for understanding the concept.
The purpose of the optimization is to find a set of investment and operational decisions that shift this distribution to the left, resulting in smaller total impacts, and the model measures the expected value of this distribution in (1). However, we may also be particularly sensitive to extreme values in the right-hand tail of this distribution, representing a subset of scenarios which produce very large impacts (in general, with small probability). The variables v s create a means of placing special emphasis on reducing the extreme impact values. To implement this mechanism, we define an input parameter that represents a threshold value of total impact for the definition of what constitutes an extreme scenario. If the system impact plus recovery effort in scenario s exceeds the value h, then v s is defined as the amount of the difference. The values of v s are penalized in the objective function (with nonnegative weights, bp s ). The weights on the v s terms in the objective function reflect both the probability of occurrence for the extreme scenarios and the overall relative weighting (b) of these large impacts relative to the expected value (which is still computed across all scenarios, extreme or not). The combination of the input parameters b and h allows tuning of the model is to extreme outcomes, by determining which outcomes are counted as extreme (h), and how heavily they are weighted (b).
Constraints (2) and (6) reflect limitations on what REI values are feasible. These constraints may include investment budget limitations, physical limitations, etc. Constraints (3) reflect limitations on the recovery effort and may include budget limits and repair task durations. Constraints (4) ensure that the flow pattern in the network, at each time period and for each scenario, is feasible. Constraints (5) implement the definition of the extreme scenarios to be penalized.
The optimization problem defined by eqs. (1)- (6) represents a general form of the model, but an understanding of its implications is much easier within the context of a specific example. Thus, the following section describes a distribution network that moves material from distribution centers to customers. This allows the equations of the general model to be defined explicitly, but within a framework that could apply to a variety of infrastructure networks (including electric power, gas distribution, water supply, food production/processing/distribution, and manufacturing supply chains).
An illustrative network example
Consider a system that consists of a set of spatially separated distribution centers (DCs) and a set of customer locations that receive some product (or set of products) from the DCs. One obvious application of this structure is where the customers are retail stores that receive products from warehouses, but the structure could also represent electrical substations receiving power from generating stations, or municipal water systems receiving water from reservoirs.
Index the customers by i and the DCs by j. Each customer has a demand q i , and each DC has a capacity K j . The distance between customer i and DC j is d ij . Under nominal conditions, each customer is connected to its nearest DC and its demand is met through that connection. Assume that the initial DC capacities are designed so that they can accommodate this operation, so that each DC has an initial capacity that equals the sum of the demands assigned to it.
The focus in this analysis is on disruptions that create inoperability of one or more DC's, and the ability of the system to continue to meet demands at the customer locations. The REI options available are as follows:
• Expansion of DC capacity: increasing DC capacities beyond their nominal levels is an example of adding absorptive capacity to the system and enables the system to more easily weather the loss of one or more DCs; • Connecting customers to a single back-up DC: this investment in the network's adaptive capacity allows the system to adapt to the loss of DC operation by reconfiguring the channels for the movement of material.
• Investment in resources to allow faster recovery from a disruption: having additional recovery resources enables the system to restore lost capacity at the DCs more quickly. This option is an example of investment in restorative capacity.
Distribution networks can be considered part of the broader definition of supply chains, and Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) provide an extensive review of articles related to supply chain resilience. They offer a conceptual model of how firms can use improved resilience in their supply chains to create competitive advantage. Petit et al. (2010) and Soni and Jain (2011) also offer conceptual models of supply chain resilience. Barroso et al. (2011) describe a scenario-based approach to evaluating strategies for increasing supply chain resilience. Their analysis is focused on what they term contingency strategies (reactive) and mitigation strategies (proactive). Their idea of a contingency strategy translates roughly to our definition of restorative capacity, and their mitigation strategies translate roughly to our definition of absorptive and adaptive capacities. They develop a spreadsheet simulation to evaluate a small number of defined strategies against a small number of possible scenarios. However, there is no optimization of the strategies, and the approach works only with a very limited number of scenarios. By applying the model formulation described in Sect. 3, we can develop much more detailed understanding of resilience in distribution networks and have the basis for addressing a variety of infrastructure network problems.
An example distribution network is shown in Fig. 5 , representing 39 customers spread throughout nine southeastern states in the United States, served by four DCs located in Memphis, TN; Nashville, TN; Knoxville, TN; and Atlanta, GA. Table 1 summarizes the customer locations, demand quantities, and DC assignments. Note that each DC location is also a customer location (customers 36-39 in the list in Table 1 ).
The DC capacities are set initially to meet the total demand assigned (computed from the q i values in Table 1) . The values are shown in Table 2 .
For this specific example, we assume a single aggregate resource used for the restoration of service after a disruption. As part of the REI, it is possible to invest in additional ''units'' of this aggregate recovery resource. The optimization model formulation is shown in Fig. 6 . Tables 3 and 4 provide descriptions of model variables and input parameters, respectively.
The objective (7) minimizes the sum of all costs considered in the model. The first line of the objective is the set of design-related costs incurred for capacity expansion (absorptive capacity), establishing back-up connections for customers to secondary DCs (adaptive capacity), and additional capability for restoring capacity after a disruption (restorative capacity). The second line of the objective reflects the expected costs (across scenarios) of the movements from DCs to customers, plus the unmet demand costs, plus the costs of restoring capacity in damaged DCs. The coefficients k and / do the unit conversion to equivalent monetary units of the total State DC Customer transportation movements and the unmet demand values. The third line of the objective includes the expected penalties (across scenarios) for un-restored capacity and extreme scenario impacts. Each of these terms also has a weighting coefficient (n and b, respectively). The objective separates the REI costs (incurred for decisions made before any disruption scenario is experienced, and that are not adjustable within individual scenarios), and the expected value of post-event costs associated with variables that reflect the specifics of each disruption scenario. The systemic impact (SI) in scenario s includes the increase in cost for movement of material, penalties for unmet demand (if any), and other costs associated with having un-restored capacity. TRE is calculated by summing the total cost of recovery resources across all time periods.
Constraints (8) and (9) govern the creation of additional connections between DCs and customers. Constraint (9) specifies the primary connections as given, implying that the decisions made in the model are only for the secondary (backup) connections. Constraint (8) allows one back-up connection for each customer, but does not force these connections to be made. Constraints (8) and (9) are the implementation of the set of constraints (2) in the general model in Sect. 3.
Constraints (10)-(13) implement the set of constraints (3) in the general model. Constraint (10) reflects the resource constraint on the restoration activities in each period. A nominal capability to restore disrupted DC capacity (B t ) is available for each period (and may vary across periods). A first-stage design decision can be made to augment that capability by an amount R. The augmentation (purchased at unit cost H, in the objective function) is assumed to be available in all periods. Individual DC facilities may require different amounts of resources to restore one unit of lost capacity (c j ). Within each period, the available resources (B t ? R) can be allocated across various damaged DC's, but the overall level of restoration activity is limited.
Constraints (11)- (13) represent the capacity evolution of DCs over time in each scenario. Figure 7 illustrates what the model is representing for a specific scenario at a given DC. The DC has an initial capacity, K. A decision is made on investment in additional (absorptive) capacity, bringing the total to K ? w. At an assumed time t = 0, the DC capacity is reduced to cðK þ wÞ. In the numerical experiments done below, the value of c is always either 0 or 1, During the first period, the DC operates with capacity cðK þ wÞ, but restoration efforts may be undertaken that will increase capacity by a value r 1 at the end of the first period. That capacity is available during the second period, and further restoration efforts increase capacity by r 2 at the end of the second period. This process continues, with restoration efforts in each period determined within the optimization. Constraint (11) defines the available capacity at DC j during period t in scenario s, denoted by U s jt . This can be no greater than the initial augmented level K ? w [constraint (12)], and the final level of capacity to which the DC is restored must be that level [constraint (13)]. Figure 8 illustrates the same restoration of DC capacity as in Fig. 7 , but the final increment of restoration is delayed from period 3 to period 4. When the restoration resources and capability are limited, such delays may be necessary, but if resources are available, it is desirable that restoration be completed as early as possible. When the initial capacity in the system is greater than the nominal demand, the optimization could delay some capacity restoration to the end of the model run without incurring unmet demand penalties or forcing any customers to be served from suboptimal DC locations. Constraint (13) forces the final capacity to be K ? w, but constraints (12) and (13) do not force the solution to restore all of the capacity as early as possible. However, this type of early recovery is desirable in the solution, so the first term in the third line of the objective function is there to produce that behavior. That term penalizes the difference between the final restored capacity (K ? w) and the currently available capacity in period t. This difference is illustrated in Fig. 8 (for period 2). By summing across time periods, this term is representing the area above the restored capacity step function and below the end value, K ? w. By placing a small cost penalty on that area, the model is encouraged to produce the solution shown in Fig. 7 , rather than the solution shown in Fig. 8 , if recovery resources are available.
Constraints (14)- (16) define feasible flows in the network, implementing constraint (4) from the general model. Constraint (14) says that movements from DC j to customer i cannot be made unless that customer is connected to the DC. Constraint (15) defines the unmet demand for cases where customer i cannot be served. In this model, partial service to customer i is possible, and that service may be provided by a combination of the primary DC connection and the secondary connection. In each period t, the available capacity at each DC (including all restoration undertaken in the first t-1 periods) is used in an optimal way to distribute material to the various customers. Constraint (16) limits the material distributed from that DC to no more than the available capacity. Fraction of capacity at DC j that remains available immediately after the disruption represented in scenario s j Ã ðiÞ Index of the closest DC to customer i under nominal conditions. k; /; b; n; l Weighting coefficients Constraint (17) is the implementation of constraint (5) from the general model. It defines the v s variables for the costs exceeding threshold h. Constraints (18) and (19) define the feasible values for the variables, implementing constraint (6) from the general model.
Computational experiments
To explore various aspects of the model, five numerical experiments have been performed using the illustrative setting of four DCs and 39 customers. All experiments are based on a set of eleven different scenarios, corresponding to the loss of all combinations of zero, one or two DC's. Possible scenarios involving three or more DC outages are not considered in these experiments. The presumption in this example is that those scenarios have sufficiently low probability that it is not worth planning for them. Four of the five experiments focus on the scenarios, their relative likelihoods, and the effects of changes on the solutions produced by the optimization model. For these four experiments, the parameter (b) for including penalties on extreme costs has been set to zero, so the model is minimizing expected costs across the set of scenarios. In the fifth experiment, the term relating to extreme costs is introduced and the effects that this term has on the model solution are illustrated. Table 5 lists the parameter values used in the five experiments.
Computations for all experiments reported here have been done using a commercial MIP solver, Lingo (version 12), (Lindo Systems 2010). For the modest example solved here, the optimization problem has approximately 22,500 variables and 23,000 constraints, and a typical solution requires about 4 min of computation time on a laptop computer. As the problem size increases (larger network, more scenarios, more time periods), the computation times will also increase.
In the first two experiments, the probability of the ''no disruption'' scenario (i.e., no DCs out of service) is set to zero. Thus, the analysis is based on an assumption that some disruption will occur, and the specified probabilities represent the relative likelihood of different types and magnitudes of disruption. The analysis in these two experiments represents a perspective in which the system owner/operator has committed to preparing for various types of disruptions and want to decide how best to do that. In that instance, the ''no disruption'' scenario becomes irrelevant (even though there may be a large probability of no disruption occurring over any given planning horizone.g., a year). Table 6 shows the assumed scenario probabilities for Experiment 1. The single-outage scenarios are assumed to be more likely than the dual outages, and disruption of the various DCs is assumed to be equally likely.
In Experiment 2, the probabilities are adjusted geographically to make outages at the eastern DCs (Atlanta and Knoxville) more likely than disruption at the western DCs (Memphis and Nashville). The scenario probabilities are shown in Table 7 .
Experiments 3 and 4 include the ''no disruption'' scenario with two different probabilities (0.7 and 0.9) attached to it, representing an analysis that reflects expected value decision making when there is a relatively large probability that nothing happens to disrupt normal operations. In both of these experiments, the assumption of equally likely disruption at the various DC's (from Experiment 1) is maintained. Tables 8 and 9 illustrate the scenario probabilities for these experiments. Figures 9, 10 , 11, 12 summarize the absorptive capacity solutions (added DC capacity) in the four experiments. In Experiment 1 (Fig. 9) , a total of 2,494 Units of capacity are added, and the additional capacity is allocated to make three of the four DC's nearly equal in total capacity. The 2,494 Units of additional capacity represents an increase of about 58 % and allows the system to absorb the capacity disruption in nearly all the scenarios with very little unmet demand. In Experiment 2 (Fig. 10) , the total added capacity is somewhat smaller (2,102 Units), and the capacity additions are focused on the western DC's (Nashville and Memphis) which have the smaller probability of disruption.
In Experiment 3, where there is a relatively high probability of no disruption at all, the amount of added capacity is substantially smaller, 888 Units, and focused in Atlanta and Memphis, as shown in Fig. 11 . In Experiment 4 (Fig. 12) , where the probability of no disruption is 0.9, the optimal solution is to not add any absorptive capacity at all. The decrease in total added capacity from Experiment 1 to Experiment 3, and from Experiment 1 to Experiment 4, mirrors the decreasing likelihood of requiring it to absorb a disruption. In Experiment 3, the added capacity is used to make the four DC's have more nearly equal total capacity, as in Experiment 1. This reflects the assumption that disruptions, should they occur, are equally likely at all DC's.
The pattern of secondary connections to customers in the four solutions is summarized in Table 10 . For Experiments 1 and 2, a total of 32 of the 39 customers have secondary connections established, but the specific connections created are not the same in the two experiments. In Experiment 1, a clear cutoff based on demand volume exists-customers with equal to 45 or higher have a secondary connection, and the remaining seven smallest customers do not. In Experiment 2, a strong correlation with demand volume is still observed, but a few exceptions are made based on customer location because the probability of disruption is not the same for all DC's.
In Experiment 3, where there is a 70 % chance of no disruption at all, the number of back-up connections to customers is only 14 and these connections are generally made for the largest customers. The majority of the backup connections are to Atlanta, and this action is consistent with the investment in absorptive capacity at that DC, noted in Fig. 11 .
In Experiment 4, where no investment in absorptive capacity is made, and the DC's all have capacity that just meets the nominal assigned demand, no back-up connections are made because in any disruption scenario the unaffected DC's would have no additional capacity to handle extra demand. The joint decisions to make no investment in either absorptive capacity or adaptive capacity in this experiment reflect the very high probability of no disruption.
It is also noteworthy that many of the back-up connections made in Experiments 1-3 are not to the second closest DC for a given customer. Although using the next closest DC would appear to be a natural, lowest cost decision for each customer when considered independently, more complex interactions of the decisions and their connections across the network need to be considered for example, the impacts that investments to increase DC capacity and the network's absorptive capacity are clearly linked to investments in adaptive capacity and back-up connections for customers. This illustrates the importance of taking a system-wide perspective on the design of investments to enhance resilience. Figure 13 shows the amount of restorative capacity investment in each of the experiments. In Experiment 1, investments in the restorative capacity allow more rapid restoration after disruptions are about 8 % of the nominal value (250) assumed to exist a priori. In Experiment 2, greater investment equal to about a 23 % increase in restoration capability occurs. This should be viewed in concert with the decision in Experiment 2 to invest less in absorptive capacity than in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, disruptions are more likely to occur in the eastern part of the network (Knoxville and Atlanta), so absorptive capacity is concentrated in the ''safer'' western DC's and is smaller in total than in Experiment 1. However, larger investment in restorative capacity allows disrupted DC's to be brought back online more quickly and reduce total system impact that way. In Experiments 3 and 4, when the likelihood of no disruption is significant, less investment in additional restorative capacity occurs, and in Experiment 4, none at all occurs. This reflects the reduced likelihood that such capacity will be needed (and also the relative costs assumed in these experiments for the various types of resilienceenhancing investments, the costs of unmet demand, etc.).
The results summarized in Figs. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 , and in Table 10 reflect the design decisions for the networkthose investments in the three types of enhancements to system resilience that allows the system to respond to a variety of potential disruption scenarios. In each scenario, adaptation and recovery decisions are made (within the limits created by the original design) to minimize the system impact and recovery effort. For example, in Experiment 1, consider scenario 5 in which Nashville and Memphis are disrupted. For this experiment, investment in absorptive capacity increases the capacity of all the DCs, so some of the customers normally served by Nashville and Memphis can be shifted to Atlanta and Knoxville. These shifts follow the pattern shown in Table 10 , where secondary connections have been established (adaptive capacity). Some customers nominally served by Nashville or Memphis (e.g., customer 2) had no secondary connection established, so their demand is unmet until capacity can be restored at their original DC. Other customers (e.g., customer 3) did have secondary connections established, but to another DC that is disrupted. This demand is also unmet until some capacity is restored at one or the other of the DCs to which they are connected. However, many of the customers nominally assigned to Nashville or Memphis have secondary connections to Atlanta or Knoxville, and these customers can be served (at least within the capacity established at Atlanta and Knoxville). Table 11 shows the unmet demand in this scenario of Experiment 1, summarized by customer location and time period. The unmet demand is concentrated in eight customer locations, four of which have no back-up connections. In the first period after the disruption, the total unmet demand is 779 Units (approximately 18 % of the total demand). During the first period, 521 Units of capacity are restored (the capability created by the 500 Units of nominal restoration capacity plus 21 Units of additional restorative capacity in which initial investment was made), and the unmet demand in the second period falls to 258 Units. By the third period, sufficient restoration has been accomplished to eliminate the unmet demand in the network. Figure 14 shows the restoration of capacity at Nashville and Memphis in this scenario. At Nashville, there is modest additional capacity investment initially (see Fig. 9 ). The nominal initial capacity of 1,473 is increased by 320 Units, to 1,793. After the capacity is lost in the disruption at t = 0, it is restored over six periods, with the original capacity of 1,473 reached after five periods. At Memphis, there is a much larger initial investment in absorptive capacity, increasing the total capacity at the DC from 940 to 1,480, an increase of approximately 57 %. After the disruption, the restoration of the total capacity requires seven periods, but the original capacity of 940 is reached after four periods. The available recovery resources are divided between the two DCs in each period, although not necessarily equally.
For each experiment, we can calculate the distribution of total impact (SI plus TRE) values across the various scenarios. For example, Fig. 15 shows the distribution for Experiment 1. The smaller impact values of (less than $1 million) are associated with the scenarios that have a single DC disrupted. The larger values correspond to the scenarios that involve two disruptions simultaneously.
In these four experiments, no special weight is placed on scenarios that cause large impact values (i.e., b = 0), but if that were changed and a value of h was specified at $1.4 million (for example), we could expect some changes in overall policy to reduce the likelihood and magnitude of the largest impacts. Experiment 5 implements values of h = $1.4 million and b = 2, with all other parameters identical to Experiment 1. Restorative Capacity (Units) Experiment Fig. 13 Restorative capacity investments in the four experiments One of the principal results from Experiment 5 is shown in Fig. 16 . Comparing Fig. 16 with Fig. 9 , we see that when the extreme impacts are weighted more heavily, there is slightly more absorptive capacity added to the system (2,632 vs. 2,494 Units), but the pattern of investments is quite similar-bringing the four DCs up to essentially equal capacity.
The total restorative capacity added in Experiment 5 is also larger than in Experiment 1 (75 vs. 21 Units). The combination of larger absorptive capacity and larger restorative capacity allows faster recovery in the most disruptive scenarios, reducing the total impact cost below the threshold. The distribution of total impact across the scenarios for Experiment 5 is shown in Fig. 17 . The range of impacts for the more severe scenarios (two DCs disrupted) has been reduced very significantly, with all six of those scenarios having nearly equal impacts.
Conclusions
Increasing network resilience involves three related capabilities-providing absorptive capacity so that the network can withstand disruptions, providing adaptive capacity so that flows through the network can be accommodated via alternate paths, and providing restorative capacity so that recovery from a disruptive event can be accomplished quickly and at minimum cost. Resilience-enhancing investments made prior to the occurrence of disruptive events are important complements to effective post-event recovery strategies and a design capability that considers pre-event and post-event decisions jointly represents an important advance in tools available to infrastructure planners/managers. This paper describes a stochastic optimization model that addresses the design question: What capabilities, resources, and/or network elements should be present to best provide network resilience against a variety of potential damage scenarios? This model includes design decisions that represent possible investments in absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and restorative capacity simultaneously. By including potential investments in all three types of resilience-enhancing capacity, as well as the recovery strategy for a variety of disruption scenarios, we have a useful framework for examining design for resilience in infrastructure networks.
Mathematically, the optimization model is a mixedinteger linear programming (MILP) problem, because it contains both continuous and discrete decision variables. It has the particular structure of a two-stage stochastic programming problem because it contains scenarios whose occurrence is uncertain and represented by probabilities. Some of the variables in the problem are first-stage variables (i.e., determined before the scenario outcome is known), and others are second-stage variables (determined specifically in each scenario).
Distribution networks that move or transform materials to meet demands (including electric power, gas distribution, water supply, food production/processing/distribution, and manufacturing supply chains) are an important class of infrastructure networks. The model in this report focuses on an example of such a network to illustrate several core ideas.
A series of computational experiments on a test network with four distribution centers and 39 customer locations has allowed exploration of the behavior of network solutions as important parameters of the problem are varied. This small set of experiments is intended to illustrate basic properties of the solutions, but is not intended to be comprehensive. A wide variety of other numerical experiments could be done with the model. Computations for all experiments reported here have been done using a commercial MILP solver. For the modest example solved here, the optimization problem has approximately 22,500 variables and 23,000 constraints, and a typical solution requires about 4 min of computation time on a laptop computer. As the problem size increases (larger network, more scenarios, more time periods), the computation times will also increase, and this provides motivation for exploring specialized solution methods that might better take advantage of the problem structure.
The two-stage stochastic programming formulation used here assumes implicitly that the pre-event condition of the system is ''normal'' and the impact of the disruption is measured relative to this nominal state. It also assumes that disruptive events are sufficiently rare that it is sufficient to consider recovery from a single event at any given time. However, as Vugrin and Camphouse (2011) note, the resilience of a system is affected by the condition of the system at the time the disruption occurs. The system may be in a degraded state because of some other recent event or series of perturbations. If a disruptive event occurs when the system is already in a partially degraded state, the impact may be larger than if the system was initially in a normal operating state. An extension of the model described here to consider uncertainty in the initial system state and the possibility of sequences of disruptive events is an important avenue of further research. Multi-stage stochastic programming may offer a useful approach, but there will likely be substantial computational challenges.
Another important direction for further work is to consider how scenarios are defined for reflecting the range of possible disruptive events of interest. The specific example analyzed here considers a range of possible events, but all are of a particular type (outage of a production node). This is useful for illustrative purposes, but analyses of system resilience face considerable uncertainty in defining what types and range of potential disruptions should be included in the planning.
The specific distribution network example analyzed here represents one form of network topology where consumption nodes are connected directly to one or two production nodes. That structure has useful practical value in several types of distribution systems, but it is not reflective of the wide range of possible network structures. The general model described in Sect. 3 admits many other types of network topology and further exploration of the effects of topology on network resilience is also an important direction for further analysis.
The approach described in this paper provides a framework for examining network design trade-offs and selecting the optimal network design configuration against a set of uncertain disruptive events. A set of numerical experiments illustrates how changes to disruption scenario probabilities affect the optimal resilient design investments. They also demonstrate how investments in one resilience capacity can affect investment decisions in other resilience capacities. These decision dependencies illustrate the need to consider resilient design investments simultaneously from a systems perspective. 
